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In this paper, we illustrate a methodology to measure discrimination in educational contexts.  In India,
we ran an exam competition through which children compete for a large financial prize.  We recruited
teachers to grade the exams. We then randomly assigned child “characteristics” (age, gender, and caste)
to the cover sheets of the exams to ensure that there is no systematic relationship between the characteristics
observed by the teachers and the quality of the exams.  We find that teachers give exams that are assigned
to be lower caste scores that are about 0.03 to 0.09 standard deviations lower than exams that are assigned
to be high caste.  The effect is small relative to the real differences in scores between the high and
lower caste children.  Low-performing, low caste children and top-performing females tend to lose
out the most due to discrimination.  Interestingly, we find that the discrimination against low caste
students is driven by low caste teachers, while teachers who belong to higher caste groups do not appear
to discriminate at all.  This result runs counter to the previous literature, which tends to find that individuals
discriminate in favor of members of their own groups.
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I.  Introduction 
Teachers’ expectations seem to affect students’ behavior.  Numerous studies have documented 
what is known as the Pygmalion effect, through which students perform better (or worse) simply 
because they are expected to do so.  For example, the seminal paper in the literature, Rosenthal 
and Jacobson (1968), has shown that individual students outperformed other students in school 
after their teachers were told at the start of the school year that they had excelled on a 
standardized test (even though they were randomly picked as “excelling”).  Although this effect 
has been well documented, we do not yet understand the factors that teachers use to formulate 
prior opinions about students’ abilities.  Of particular concern is whether or not teachers base 
their beliefs on students’ affiliations with a minority group.  If this type of discrimination does 
exist, it can have long lasting effects, both reinforcing erroneous beliefs of inferiority (Steele and 
Aronson 1995, 1998; Hoff and Pandey, 2006) and discouraging children from making human 
capital investments (Mechtenberg, 2008; Taijel, 1970; Arrow 1972; Coate and Loury, 1993).  
Discrimination would, thus, hinder the effectiveness of education in leveling the playing field 
across children from different backgrounds. 
Unfortunately, it is difficult to empirically  test  whether  discrimination  exists  in the 
classroom.  By definition, children from disadvantaged backgrounds exhibit many characteristics 
that are associated with poor academic performance—few educational resources in schools, low 
levels of parental education, families with little human or social capital, and even high rates of 
child labor.  Thus, it is hard to understand whether children who belong to these minority groups 
perform worse in school, on average, due to discrimination or due to these other characteristics 
that may be associated with a disadvantaged background.  Moreover, as Anderson, Fryer and 
Holt (2006) discuss, “uncovering mechanisms behind discrimination is difficult because the 2 
 
attitudes  about race, gender, and other characteristics that serve as a basis for differential 
treatment are not easily observed or measured.”   
We address this question through an experiment built around a prize exam competition.  
The method we illustrate can be used to measure discrimination in many educational contexts 
and locations; however, we demonstrate it in the Indian context, where discrimination based on 
caste is a potentially serious problem.  Specifically, we designed an exam competition in which 
we recruited children to compete for a large financial prize.  We, then, recruited local teachers 
and provided each teacher with a set of exams.  We randomly assigned child “characteristics” 
(age, gender, and caste) to the cover sheets of the individual exams graded by the teachers to 
ensure that there would be no systematic relationship between the characteristics observed by the 
teachers and the quality of the exams. 
This design has several  key  advantages.  First,  the random assignment allows us to 
overcome one of the major obstacles in measuring discrimination.  Specifically, we can attribute 
any differences in the exam scores across different types of children to discrimination and not to 
other characteristics associated with belonging to a disadvantaged group.  Second, the richness of 
the data available in the experiment allows us to investigate the structure of the observed 
discrimination and to understand how teachers discriminate, when they discriminate, and against 
which types of students. 
Within the education literature, our work is closely related to a rich body of work in the 
United States that uses laboratory experiments to evaluate teachers’ perceptions of African 
American students relative to Caucasian students.  While the employed techniques range from 
evaluations of actual tests to video tapes of student performance and to measurements of teachers 
reactions to different students (see Furgeson (2003) for a thorough literature review), the basic 3 
 
strategy is to hold students’ performance constant while varying the race of the student so that 
any variation in the experimental subjects’ reaction to the student is due only to the students’ 
race.  Most of these studies find evidence of lower expectations of the performance of African 
American students and evidence of discrimination in evaluations.  Our work is also very much 
also related to Lavy (2004),  which uses a natural experiment to measure  discrimination in 
grading by gender in Israel. 
  However, our methods are most analogous to the types of field experiments that have 
been used to measure racial discrimination in labor market settings.  These experiments typically 
measure discrimination in the hiring of actual applicants.  The researchers either have actual 
individuals apply for jobs (Fix and Struyk, 1994) or they may submit fictitious job applications 
to actual job openings (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004; Banerjee, Bertrand, Mullainathan, and 
Datta, 2009; Siddique, 2008); in both cases, the “applicants” are statistically identical in all 
respects,  except for race or caste group.  Unlike pure  laboratory experiments,  in which 
individuals are asked to perform assessments in a consequence-less environment,  a  major 
advantage of these experiments is that they are able to measure the behavior of actual employers 
making real employment decisions.   
In our study, we break the correlation between observed characteristics and student 
quality by randomly assigning characteristics to an exam cover sheet before it is graded.  We 
then place teachers in an environment in which their behavior affects the wellbeing of the child, 
In particular, teachers know that the results of their grading will result in a substantial prize to the 
winning child (58 USD or 55.5 percent of the parents’ monthly income).  Thus, we are able to 
mimic the incentives faced by teachers in the classroom. 4 
 
We find evidence of discrimination against lower caste children.  Specifically, we find 
that teachers give exams that are assigned to be “lower caste” scores that are about 0.03 to 0.09 
standard deviations lower than those that are assigned to be “high caste.”  We do not find any 
overall evidence of discrimination by gender or age.  Disaggregating the results by the quality of 
the exam, the low-performing, low caste children and top-performing females tend to lose out the 
most due to discrimination.  Interestingly, we find that the discrimination against low caste 
children is driven by low caste teachers, while teachers from the high caste groups do not appear 
to discriminate at all.  Finally, we find that teachers tend to discriminate more towards children 
who  are graded early in the evaluation process, suggesting that teachers use demographic 
characteristics to help grade when they are not yet confident with a testing instrument.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section II provides some background on caste 
discrimination and education in India.  Section III describes the methodology, while Section IV 
describes our data.  Our findings are presented in Section V.  Section VI provides a discussion of 
the key results, while Section VII concludes. 
 
II.  Background  
In India, individuals in the majority Hindu religion were traditionally divided into hereditary 
caste groups that denoted both a family’s place within the social hierarchy and their professional 
occupation.  In order of prestige, these castes were the Brahmin, Kshatriya, Vaishya, and Shudra 
denoting respectively, priests, warriors/nobility, traders/farmers, and manual laborers.  Within 
each main caste, many subcastes exist that also have varying levels of prestige.   
In principle, individuals are now free to choose occupations regardless of caste, but like 
race in the United States, the historical distinctions have created inequities that still exert 5 
 
powerful social and economic influence.
1
In this section, we first  describe the methodology  that  we designed to understand whether 
discrimination exists in grading.  We then  discuss  the data  and  lay out our  empirical 
methodology.   
  Given the large  gap  in  family  income  and labor 
market opportunities between  children from lower and high  caste groups, it is not that 
unsurprising that children from traditionally more disadvantaged caste groups tend to have worse 
educational outcomes than those from the more advantaged groups.  For example, Bertrand, 
Hanna, and Mullainathan (2008) show large differences in entrance exam scores across caste 
groups entering engineering colleges, while Holla (2008) shows similar differences in final high 
school exams. 
While it is difficult to identify the influence of caste separately from poverty and low 
socio-economic status, the potential for discrimination in schools is significant.  Both urban and 
rural schools maintain detailed records of their students’ caste and religion, along with other 
demographic information such as their age, gender, and various information on their parents (see, 
for example, He, Linden, and MacLeod, 2008).  Anecdotal evidence suggests that teachers may 
take this information into account.  For example, the Probe Report of India (1999) cites cases of 
teachers banning lower caste students from joining school.  Shastry and Linden (2008) show that 
caste is correlated with the degree to which teachers are willing to exaggerate the attendance of 
students enrolled in an educational program that provides grain to high attending students.   
 
III.  Methodology 
                                                 
1 Banerjee and Knight (1985); Lakshmanasamy and Madheswaran (1995); Unni (2002) give evidence of inequality 
across groups by earnings, while Rao (1992), Chandra (1997), and Munshi and Rosenzweig (2005) show evidence 
of inequality in social and economic mobility.  Deshpande and Newman (2007) and Madeshwaran and Attewell 
(2007) provide some evidence of discrimination in earnings, while Siddique (2008) and Jodhka and Newman (2007) 
for discrimination in hiring practices. 6 
 
 
A.  Research Design 
We designed an experiment  that  comprises  of  three components: child testing sessions, the 
creation of grading packets, and teacher grading sessions.  We first recruited children to 
participate in a prized exam competition.  After the competition, we copied the tests that the 
children completed and compiled them into grading packets.  Each test copy in the grading 
packet  was assigned an information sheet that included randomly assigned demographic 
characteristics.  We then recruited local teachers to participate in a grading session, during which 
the teachers graded the exams that displayed the randomly assigned characteristics.   
 
Child Testing Sessions 
In April 2007, we ran exam tournaments for children aged seven to fourteen years of age.  Our 
project team went door to door to invite parents to allow their children to attend a testing session 
to compete for a Rs 2500 prize (about $US 58).
2
Over a two week period, sixty-eight children attended four testing sessions.  The testing 
sessions were held in various places,  such as community halls, empty homes, or temples, 
  The project team informed the families that 
prizes would be distributed to the highest scoring child in each of the two age groups (7 to 10 
years of age, and 11 to 14 years of age), that the exams would be graded by local teachers after 
the testing sessions, and that the prize would be distributed after the grading was complete.  The 
prize is a significant sum of money, given that the parents reported earning an average of 4,500 
Rs per month ($US 104) in the parent survey that we administered. 
                                                 
2 For recruitment, our project team mapped the city:  they collected demographic information about each community 
and also identified community leaders who they might be able to work with later in the project.  To ensure that 
children of varying castes would be present at each session, the team tried to either recruit from neighborhoods 
where the children were of diverse caste groups or to recruit from several uniform caste neighborhoods.  7 
 
centrally located to the communities from which the children were selected.  They were held on 
weekends to ensure that they did not conflict with the school day and that parents would be able 
to accompany the children to the sessions.  During the testing sessions, the survey team first 
obtained informed consent from the parents for both their participation in the parent survey and 
their child’s participation in the tournament.  Next, the survey team administered a short survey 
to the children’s parents to collect information on the child (gender, age) and to also collect basic 
demographic characteristics of the family (income background, employment status of the father, 
and caste information).   
After the survey, the project team obtained written assent from each participating child 
and began the actual exam.  To  vary the subjectivity of the exam  questions,  we included 
questions that tested the  basic math  and  language  skills  contained in the standard Indian 
curriculum, as well as an art section in which the children were asked to display their creativity.  
The exam took approximately 1.5 hours.  All children who participated in the testing session 
received a reading workbook  at the time of the sessions and were told that they would be 
contacted with information about the prize when grading was complete. 
 
Randomizing Child Characteristics 
The key to our experimental design is to break the correlation between the children’s actual 
performance on an exam and the child characteristics perceived by the teacher when grading the 
exam.  In a typical classroom setting, one can only access data on the actual grades teachers 
assign to students whose characteristics the teachers know.  This makes it impossible to identify 
what grade the teacher would have assigned had another child, with different socio-economic 
characteristics, completed the exam in an identical manner.  Our experimental design allows us 8 
 
to ensure the independence of the exams’  quality and the characteristics observed by the 
teachers. 
Specifically, we randomized the demographic characteristics observed by teachers on 
each exam.  Each teacher was asked to grade a packet containing 25 exams.  To form these 
packets, each test completed by a student was stripped of identifying information, assigned an ID 
number, and photocopied.  Twenty-five copies were then randomly selected to form each packet, 
without replacement, to ensure that the same teacher did not grade the same photocopied test 
more than once.  Each exam in the packet was then assigned a socio-demographic coversheet, 
which contained the basic demographic information for the “child.”  This included a child’s first 
name, last name, gender, caste information, and age.
3  However, these child characteristics were 
randomly assigned from the characteristics of children sitting for the exams.  By teacher, we 
stratified the assignment of the characteristics to ensure that each teacher observed coversheets 
with the same proportion of characteristics of each type of child, avoiding the possibility that a 
teacher was assigned to grade children of a single sex or caste.  Since most Indian first names are 
gender specific, the first name and gender were always randomized together.  Similarly, many 
last names are also caste specific and, therefore, we randomized the last name and the caste 
together.
4
  Caste, age, and gender were each drawn from an independent distribution.  We randomly 
selected the ages of the students from a uniform distribution between eight and fourteen.  We 
ensured that gender was equally distributed among the males and females. Caste was assigned 
  For each teacher, we sampled the name of the child without replacement so that the 
teacher would not be grading two different exams from the same child.  
                                                 
3 We also include caste categories (General, Other Backward Caste, Scheduled Caste, and Scheduled Tribe), which 
are groupings of the caste categories. 
4 While this strategy has the advantage of consistently conveying the caste information to teachers, it does prevent us 
from identifying the specific channel through which teachers are getting the information.  It may be possible, for 
example, that the name alone is enough to convey the caste of the child. 9 
 
according to the following distribution.  Twelve and a half percent of the exams were assigned 
each to the highest caste (Brahmin) and the next caste (Kshatriya).  Fifty percent of the exams 
were assigned to the Vaishya Caste and twenty-five percent were assigned to the Shudra Caste.
5
  The recruitment proceeded as follows.  First, the project team talked with the headmaster 
of the school to obtain permission to recruit teachers from the school.  Once permission was 
obtained, the project team explained to the teachers that they would like to invite  them to 
participate in a study to understand grading practices.  The teachers were told that they would 
grade the exams of twenty-five children and that they would be compensated for their work with 
a Rs 250 (about $US 5.80) payment.  The project team also informed the teachers that the child 
who obtained the highest score based on the grading would receive a prize worth Rs 2500 (about 
 
  Each exam was graded by an average of forty-three  teachers.  Since the “observed” 
characteristics of the child were randomly assigned, we would expect that these characteristics 
would be uncorrelated with the exam grade in a world with no discrimination.  Any correlation 
between the “observed” characteristics and exam scores is, thus, evidence of discrimination. 
 
Teacher Grading Sessions 
After creating the packets, we recruited teachers to grade the exams.  We obtained a listing of 
schools in the city from the local government, and we divided the schools into government and 
private schools.  For each category, we ranked the schools using a random number generator.  
The project team began recruitment at the schools at the top of the list, and went down the list 
until they obtained the desired number of teachers.  In total, the project team visited about 167 
schools to recruit 120 teachers, 67 from government schools and 53 from private schools. 
                                                 
5 The purpose of this distribution was originally to ensure variation in both caste and the caste categories to which 
children could be assigned.  These classifications are restricted to the lowest two classes and ensure equal 
distribution among each category, resulting in 75 percent of the exams being assigned to these castes.   10 
 
$US 58).  This prize was designed to establish incentives for the teachers’ grading by ensuring 
that the grades received on the exam have real effects on the well-being of the children, thereby 
mimicking the incentives faced by teachers in school. 
On average, a grading session lasted about two hours for each teacher.  At the sessions, 
the project team first obtained consent.  Next, the project team provided the teachers with a 
complete set of answers for the math and language sections of the test, and the point system per 
question for all three sections of the test.  The project team went through the answer set question 
by question with the teachers.  Teachers were told that partial credit was allowed, but the project 
team did not describe how partial credit should be allocated.  Thus, the teachers had the 
discretion to allocate partial credit points as they felt appropriate. 
Next, the grading portion  of the session began.  The  teacher received twenty-five 
randomly selected  exams—with the randomly assigned cover sheets—to  grade  as well as  a 
“testing roster” to fill out.  To ensure that teachers viewed the demographic information, we 
asked them to copy the information from the cover sheet onto the grade roster.  They were then 
asked to grade the exam and input the total score and the individual grades for each section of the 
exam—math, language, and art—onto the testing roster.   
When  a teacher  finished grading his or her packet of exams,  the project team 
administered a short survey to the teacher.  The survey consisted of questions designed to gauge 
the demographic characteristics and teaching philosophy of each teacher.   11 
 
After all the grading sessions were complete, we computed the average grade for each 
child across all teachers who graded his or her exam.  We then awarded the prize to the highest 
scoring child in each of the age categories, based on these average grades.
6
                                                 
6As the tests were equally likely to be assigned the characteristics described any negative (or positive effects) 
received from being assigned particular characteristics should be equal across individual tests, making the overall 
average a fair assessment of student performance.   
 
 
B.  Data Description 
We compiled three sets of data:  exam scores, parent surveys, and teacher surveys.  We collected 
two sets of exam scores.  The first set includes the test scores generated by each teacher.   In 
addition, a member of the research staff graded each exam using the same grading procedures as 
the teacher, but on a “blind” basis in which they had no access to the original characteristics of 
the students taking  the exam or any assigned characteristics.  This was done to provide an 
“objective” assessment of the quality of the individual exam.  The set of exam scores includes 
the total score and a score on each subject (math, hindi, and art). 
Each subject was chosen to provide variation in the objectivity with which the individual 
sections could be evaluated.  Math was chosen to be the most objective section and questions 
covered counting, greater  than/less than, number sequences, addition, subtraction, basic 
multiplication, basic addition, and simple word problems among a few other basic competencies.  
Language, which  was chosen to be the intermediately objective section, included  questions 
covering basic vocabulary, spelling, synonyms, antonyms, and basic reading comprehension, and 
so forth.  Finally, the art section was designed to be the most subjective.  In this section, we 
asked the children to draw a picture of their family doing their favorite activity and then to 
explain the activity. 12 
 
  We normalized the exam scores of each section and the overall total scores in the analysis 
that follows, to facilitate comparisons with other studies in the literature.  To do so, we pool all 
of the grades assigned to each test copy by the teachers, and for each exam, subtract the overall 
mean and divide by the standard deviation of the scores.  Each section and the overall exam 
score are normalized relative to the distribution of the individual scores  for the respective 
measure.
7
The random assignment of tests to teachers and children’s characteristics to the coversheets 
should ensure that there is no systematic correlation between the quality of the graded tests, the 
   
  In addition to the test data, we have data from the two surveys we administered.  First, we 
have data from a survey  of  the  children’s  parents  that was conducted  in order to collect 
information on the socio-demographic background of the children.  Most importantly for the 
experiment, this included information on the family’s caste, the age of the child, and the child’s 
gender.  Second, we have data from the teacher survey, which included basic demographic 
information as well as questions regarding the types of students that the teachers normally teach.  
The demographic information included the teachers’ religion, caste, the type of school at which 
they taught (public or private), their educational background, age, and gender.  In addition, we 
also collected information  on  the characteristics of teachers’ students.  Note that there was 
almost no variation in teachers’ responses to these questions – all of the teachers taught low 
income students like those in our sample, either in a local public or private school.  
 
C. Empirical Strategy 
                                                 
7 In results not presented in this draft, we have also estimated the results normalizing relative to the distribution of 
blind test scores.  Since this is a linear transformation of the dependent variable, it does not affect the hypothesis 
tests, nor does it affect the magnitude of the estimated results.   13 
 
characteristics of the grader, and the characteristics on the coversheet.  We check this assumption 
using the following model: 
  ij ij ij v z ε β + =   (1) 
In this equation,  ij z  is the original characteristic of the exam that was taken by child i and was 
graded by teacher j .   ij v  is a vector that is comprised of the randomly assigned characteristics 
(gender, age, and caste).  We use two different specifications for  ij v .  For our main specification, 
we include an indicator variable for whether the test was assigned to one of the lower caste 
groups, allowing us to contrast the treatment of children in the lower caste groups to that of the 
high.  In the specification shown in Appendix Table 2, we use a series of indicator variables for 
the specific caste groups (Brahmin, Kshatriya, Vaishya, or Shudra) that were assigned. 
Using a model similar to Equation 1, we can, then, estimate the effect of the assigned 
characteristics on teacher test scores: 
  ij ij ij v y ε β + =   (2) 
where the variable  ij y  is the test score assigned to test i by the teacher  j .  While the random 
assignment eliminates the systematic correlation between the true child characteristics and those 
observed by the teachers, it is possible that small differences in the types of tests assigned to each 
category will exist in any finite sample.  To ensure that our estimates are robust to these small 
differences, we estimated two additional specifications.  First, we include a difference estimator 
that controls for child characteristics.  The difference estimator takes the following form: 
  ij ij ij ij z v y ε δ β + + =   (3) 14 
 
The vector of randomly assigned characteristics is given by  ij v  as in equation (1), and  ij z  is a 
linear control function that includes the true characteristics of the child taking test i.  Second, we 
include a fixed-effects estimator, which takes the following form: 
  ij j j ij ij ij w z v y ε τ δ β + + + =   (4) 
where  j w is the grader fixed effects.  This specification allows us to control for fixed differences 
in grading practices across teachers. 
 
IV. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND INTERNAL VALIDITY 
In this section, we first provide descriptive statistics on the characteristics of the children who sat 
for  the exam and the teachers who graded it.  Next, we explore whether the original 
characteristics of the child predicts the exam score.  Finally, we provide a check on the 
randomization. 
 
A. Baseline Data 
In Table 1, we provide descriptive statistics on the 120 teachers who participated in the exam 
competition.  Panel A provides information on the demographic characteristics of the teachers, 
while Panel B provides sample statistics on their caste identity and beliefs.  In Column 1, we 
provide the summary statistics for the full sample.  In the subsequent columns, we disaggregate 
the data by their basic demographic characteristics:  in Columns 2 and 3, we divide the sample 
by the teachers’ caste.  In Columns 4 and 5, we disaggregate the sample by the teachers’ gender, 
and finally, we divide the sample by the teachers’ education level in Columns 6 and 7.  
Reflecting the fact that teaching (especially at a public school) is a well-paid and 
desirable occupation, sixty-eight percent of the teachers identify themselves as belonging to the 15 
 
upper caste groups (Panel A, Column 1).  Teachers tend to be relatively young (an average age 
of thirty five) and female (seventy-three percent).   We made a point to recruit at both public and 
private schools.  The effort was successful in that we recruited a fairly equal number of teachers 
across the two groups into the sample.  Forty-four percent of the teachers work in public schools, 
while fifty-six percent work in private schools.  About half the sample holds a master’s degree. 
As Panel B demonstrates, caste identity is high among the teachers.  Sixty-four percent 
report that their closest friend is of the same caste grouping and forty-one percent report that they 
belong to a caste association.  Interestingly, even the teachers themselves tend to report that they 
believe that “teachers favor some students over others in their grading for reasons unrelated to 
educational performance.”  Eighty-one percent of the teachers agreed with this statement. 
  Comparing the characteristics of teachers across Columns 2 through 7, the relationships 
between the various characteristics generally follows the expected patterns.  Low caste teachers 
are more represented in the comparatively less desirable private school teaching positions, less 
likely to have a master’s degree, more likely to be male, and more likely to belong to a caste 
association (Columns 2 – 3).  Female teachers tend to belong to the high caste groups (75 percent 
for versus 48 percent for men) and are also more likely to have a master’s degree (Columns 4 – 
5).  The somewhat surprising pattern lies in the relationship between education and beliefs (Panel 
B, Columns 6 – 7).  We do not observe a difference in caste identity or beliefs across those with 
and without a master’s degree.   
  In Table 2, we provide summary statistics for the children who participated in the exam 
competition  and the characteristics observed by the teachers.  We  describe  the  original 
characteristics of the children and the characteristics of the children observed by the teacher in 
Columns 1 and 2, respectively.  Column 1 contains averages for the actual sixty-nine children, 16 
 
while Column 2 contains averages for the 3,000 exam copies graded by the teachers.  Standard 
deviations are provided in parentheses below each average. 
  Panel A provides the percentage of children who belong to the high caste group, while 
Panel B disaggregates the lower caste group by specific caste.  In our sample, eighteen percent of 
the children originally belonged to the high caste group, while only twelve percent were assigned 
to the lowest caste group.   Despite an effort to recruit children from the lowest caste, only six 
percent originally come from the Shudra group.  As we were interested in the effects on this 
specific subgroup, we increased the observed in this category to twenty-five percent.  In Panel C, 
we show the average age and gender of the children.  The mean observed age of the children (11 
years) is approximately the same as the mean age of children in the sample (10.9 years).  To 
maximize power, we elected to have equal sized gender groups, and therefore, there are more 
females in the observed sample (50 percent) as compared to the actual sample (43 percent). 
  Table 3 provides a description of the average quality of the tests taken by the children.  
Rather than the normalized scores used in the rest of our analysis, we provide the test score 
measures as the fraction of total possible points, for easy interpretation.  On average, students 
scored a total of 63 percent on the exam.  Students scored the lowest in art (47 percent) and the 
highest in math (68 percent).   
The  data  suggest  that the grading of the  exam’s  art section may  have been more 
subjective than the grading of the math or language sections.  The means of the teachers’ test 
scores for the math and language exams are very similar to those of the blind graders (Panel B of 
Table 3).  In addition, the variance on the math and language sections of the exams are almost 
equal at 0.23 and 0.16 percentage points, respectively, on both the teacher and the blind test 
scores.  On the other hand, the average art scores given by the teacher are much lower, with a 17 
 
mean of 47 percent for the teachers compared with 64 percent for the blind graders. Moreover, 
the larger variance for the art section (0.32) provides confirming evidence that, as intended, the 
art section may have been more subjective than the other sections of the exam.   
Moving  away from the differences in subjectivity across tests, the data indicate that 
regardless of the subject, teachers do exhibit a fair amount of discretion in grading overall.  
Figure 1 provides a description of the total test score range (in percentages) per test.  The score 
ranges per exam are quite large, particularly at the lower portion of the test quality distribution.  
This indicates that the teachers assign partial credit very differently. 
  Who won the exam competition?  In reality, low caste females won both age categories.  
The two winning exams each displayed the low caste characteristics about 80 percent of the time.  
About half the time, the winning exams were assigned as female and the average age on the 
winning exams was eleven years old.  Thus, the winning exam was, on average, assigned the 
mean characteristics in our sample, as we would predict given the randomization. 
 
B.  Do Actual Characteristics Predict Exam Scores? 
We next investigate the relationship between the actual characteristics of the children in our 
sample and their exam scores.  In the first column of Table 4, we present the simple correlation 
between the total test scores that the teachers assigned to the exams and the true underlying 
characteristics of the children.  In Column 2, we add the blind test score as an additional control.  
In Columns 3 -5, we disaggregate the test scores by individual subjects.  All scores have been 
normalized relative to the overall distribution of scores for each respective section.   
The children’s original demographic characteristics strongly predict the exam scores. 
Children from the lower caste group score about 0.41 standard deviations worse on the exam 18 
 
than the high caste group (Column 1).
8
                                                 
8Appendix Table 1 replicates the table including disaggregated caste groups.  Recall that the caste groups in terms of 
descending order of prestige are the Brahmin, Kshatriya, Vaishya, and Shudra castes.  Children who belong to 
Kshatriya caste perform worse (-0.17 standard deviations) than the students who belong to Brahman caste, which is 
the omitted category in the regressions (Column 1).  Children from the Vaishya caste then score worse than the 
students from the Kshatriya caste by 0.35 standard deviations, and children who belong to the Shudra group score 
the worst (-1.17 standard deviations lower than the children from the Brahman caste).   
  Females, on average, score 0.18 standard deviations 
higher  on the exam than males.  Finally, one additional year of age is associated with an 
additional 0.85 standard deviations in score, although this effect is declining with years of age.   
In Column 2, we replicate the specification in Column 1, adding the score that our blind 
grader awarded to each exam as an additional control variable.  The blind score provides us with 
a measure of performance on the exam that reflects only the underlying quality of the exam.  
Any difference between the test scores from the teachers and the scores from the blind grading 
can be attributed partially to discrimination, but also to the natural variation in grading practices.  
The total blind score awarded to the test is highly correlated with the score that the teachers 
assigned to the tests.  On average, a one standard deviation increase in the blind scores results in 
a 0.93 standard deviations increase in the total test score. When we include the blind test score, 
the coefficients on the low caste and female indicator variables more closer to zero, but the age 
variable still is a significant predictor of the final score.   
  We, next, disaggregate the test score data by subject in Columns 3 – 5 of Table 4.  The 
results suggest that the different sections of the exam do provide variation in subjectivity, with 
the art section being much more subjective than the other sections.  The correlation between the 
blind score and the teacher’s score for the math and language sections is the same as for the 
overall score (about 0.93).  The art section, however, has a coefficient that is only 0.63.   Even 
when including the blind test score, the original caste status significantly predicts the math and 
art scores and the child’s original age still predicts the test scores in all three subjects.  19 
 
 
C.  Internal Validity 
In order to determine  whether discrimination exists,  we must first confirm that the average 
characteristics assigned to each test during the randomization process are effectively the same.  
We can test for this in two ways.  First, we can verify this by regressing the actual characteristics 
of the children  on  each exam on the characteristics assigned to the exams  by the random 
assignment process (Table 5, Column 1 – 3).  Second, we can regress the test scores from the 
blind grading of the exam on the characteristics assigned to the exams (Columns 4 – 7).  For 
each specification, we present the coefficients on each observed characteristic, as well as the F-
statistic  from  the  joint hypothesis test of the statistical significance of all the observed 
characteristics.  For convenience, we also provide the p-value of the joint test. 
  The results described  in  Table  5  demonstrate that the random assignment process 
succeeded in assigning characteristics to the cover sheets that are, on average, uncorrelated with 
the actual characteristics or performance of the children.  With the exception of the fact that tests 
from actual females are more likely to be assigned to a lower age group, none of the other 
coefficients are significant.  In terms of magnitude, all of the coefficients are practically small; 
almost every coefficient is less than 1/10 of a standard deviation.  The chi-square estimates 
provide further evidence that the assigned characteristics are uncorrelated with the actual exams.  
Of the seven estimated equations, none are statistically significant at the 10 percent level.  In 
particular, as shown in Column 4, we find little correlation between all of the assigned 
characteristics and the quality of the exam, as measured by the blind test score (p-value of .64).
9
 
   
                                                 
9 In Appendix Table 2, we disaggregate the exam data by individual caste group.  The table further confirms that the 
randomization was successful, as the individual castes are uncorrelated with the actual characteristics and the blind 
test score. 20 
 
V. Results 
We  now turn to our experimental results.  In  Section A, we  test for the  overall levels of 
discrimination and we also measure the discrimination effects by place within the test score 
distribution.  In Section B, we study whether the parameters we set for the test—grading order 
and test type— affect how teachers grade.  Finally, in Section C, we compare the relative degree 
of discrimination both  across  the  children’s  specific caste groups and across teachers  who 
possess different demographic characteristics.   
 
A.  Overall Results 
In Table 6, we present the results of the regression of the exam scores on observed caste.  In 
Column 1, we provide the overall effects of the observed caste on the test scores assigned by the 
teachers.  Given the randomization, we do not necessarily need to include control variables for 
the characteristics of the child and the teacher.  However, doing so may provide us with greater 
precision.  Therefore, in Column 2, we present the results of specifications in which we control 
for the actual  child’s  baseline  characteristics.  In Column 3, we present the results of the 
specification that includes the grader fixed effect.  As a robustness check, we additionally control 
for the blind test score in Column 4.  The blind test score can be viewed as another measure of 
the underlying characteristics of the child who took the exam.   
We first examine the results on caste.  Looking at Column 1, we find that the teachers 
gave, on average, the  exams  assigned  as  “low  caste”  test scores that were 0.09 standard 
deviations lower than an exam that was assigned to be from the “high caste” group (significant at 
the ten percent level).
10
                                                 
10 It is important to note that in what follows, we can only measure the relative treatment of children in the highest 
caste to lower caste children.  In all specifications, the highest caste children are the omitted category and the 
  Controlling for child characteristics (Columns 2) and teacher fixed 21 
 
effects (Column 3) does not significantly  affect  the estimate on the lower  caste indicator 
variable, but the addition of the controls improves the precision of the estimates, which are now 
statistically significant at the five percent level.  The addition of the blind test score causes the 
point estimate to fall to -0.027  (Column  3).  The estimate, however,  remains  statistically 
significant at the ten percent level. 
Our results suggest that while discrimination may be present, the magnitude of the overall 
effect is relatively small when compared to the actual differences in test scores across the caste 
groups.  The caste gap due to discrimination from our preferred specification in Column 3 
(including teacher fixed effects and original characteristics control variables) is -0.086, which is 
much smaller than the actual 0.41 standard deviation gap described in Table 3.
11
  Interestingly, we do not find any effect of assigned gender or age on total test scores, 
regardless of specification (Table  6).  Note that in addition to not being significant, the 
   The effect size 
falls within the lower tail of the distribution of the impacts of various education interventions in 
the developing world  that have been evaluated by randomized experiments.  Successful 
interventions have typically fallen within a 0.07 to 0.24 standard deviation range; this range 
includes evaluations of programs that provide additional teachers (Banerjee, Cole, Duflo, and 
Linden, 2007),  teacher monitoring  and incentive  programs (Duflo, Hanna, and Ryan, 2007; 
Glewwe,  Illias, and Kremer, 2003), tracking programs (Duflo, Dupas,  and Kremer, 2008), 
scholarships for girls (Kremer, Miguel, and Thornton,  2007), and contract  teachers 
(Muralidharan and Sundararaman, 2008).   
                                                                                                                                                             
indicator variable for the lower castes measures the difference between the lower castes and the highest caste.  We 
cannot assess, for example, whether teachers are biased in favor of high caste children  or against lower caste 
children. 
11The finding that discrimination accounts for only a small percentage of the difference between groups has been 
documented in other settings, such as Levitt (2004), who finds that, when discrimination is present, it is not the 
leading factor of how people vote in the game show the weakest link.   22 
 
magnitudes of the effects are very small.  For example, being labeled with an additional year of 
age provides between a 0.001 – 0.003 increase in score. 
  In Table 7, we test whether the underlying exam quality influences the teacher’s actions.   
In Column 1, we interact the blind test score with the observed characteristics and control for the 
blind test score, using the following equation: 
ij j j ij i ij i ij ij w z q v q v y ε τ δ η λ β + + + + + = *                                            (5) 
where  i q is the blind test score for test i.  We find that the teachers grade the low caste exams 
down by 0.029 standard deviations.  However, possessing a higher quality exam mitigates this 
effect.  Specifically, a one standard deviation increase in the blind test score leads to a 0.03 
standard deviation increase in the difference between the low caste and high caste groups 
(statistically significant at the ten percent level). 
  We next create a variable that indicates whether an exam possesses a high underlying 
quality.  Specifically, the variable equals 1 if the blind test score is above average and equals 
zero otherwise.  We then estimate a specification that includes the interactions of this variable 
with each of the assigned demographic characteristics.  We find that teachers grade the below 
average  exams that were assigned to be low caste down by -0.108 standard deviations 
(statistically significant at the 5 percent level).  However, they grade the exams that are high 
quality up by 0.083;  however,  it is important to note that this  effect  is only statistically 
significant at the 20 percent level.  Thus, there is some evidence that teachers help low caste 
children who show some promise, but hurt low caste children that match perceived stereotypes.  
Interestingly, we also see that teachers grade low quality exams that were assigned to be female 
up by 0.107 standard deviations (significant at the 1 percent level), but then grade the high 
quality exams down by the almost the same magnitude (significant at the 1 percent level).  Thus, 23 
 
while on average girls do not appear to be discriminated against, top performing girls tend to be 
assigned lower grades than high performing boys for similar quality work. 
  To provide additional detail on the relationship between caste discrimination and test 
quality, we construct a non-parametric estimate of the relationship between the score assigned to 
the exam and the score from the blind grading.  The estimates are constructed using a local linear 
polynomial estimator (bandwidth of 0.4) and are presented in Figure 2.  The solid line represents 
the scores assigned to tests labeled as  high caste and the dashed line represents the scores 
assigned to the tests labeled as lower caste.  There is a clear break that emerges in the data at 
about -1.1 standard deviations, in which the high caste children are consistently scored higher 
than the lower caste children.  To estimate this directly, we interact the lower caste indicator with 
an indicator for having a blindly graded score below -1.1 standard deviations (Column 3 of Table 
7).  Consistent with Figure 2, lower caste children with a blind test score below -1.1 standard 
deviations score, on average, -0.15 standard deviations lower than their high caste peers. 
 
B.  Parameters of the Exam 
In addition to discriminating for (or against) particular types of children, it is also possible that 
teachers may be more likely to discriminate in particular types of situations.  To explore these 
types of issues, we incorporated two features into the exam:  the random ordering of grading and 
exam sections with varying levels of subjectivity.   
  For each teacher, we created a packet in which we specified the order in which teachers 
should grade the exam.  Therefore, for each teacher, we know which exams were graded first and 
which exams were graded towards the end.  Using this knowledge, we can test whether teachers 
discriminate more at the start of the packet, when they were first getting used to the format of the 24 
 
particular test.   In Column 1 of Table 8, we show the results between the interaction of the 
observed characteristics and the place in the grading order (which varies by teacher from 1 to 
25), controlling for the place in the grading order in which the exam was graded.  In Column 2, 
we show the results of the interaction between the observed characteristics and a variable that 
indicates that the exam was graded in the first half of the teacher’s pile.  All regressions include 
the original test characteristics and the grader fixed effect. 
  We find that the grading order matters.  Teachers mark exams that are assigned to be low 
caste 0.23 standard deviations lower (significant at the 5 percent level; Column 1).  However, as 
grading order increases, the difference is mitigated.  As shown in Column 2, being graded in the 
first half of the packet implies a 0.12 standard deviation gap between the exams that were 
assigned to be low and high caste (although this is only significant at about the 20 percent level) 
and a 0.10 gap between the exams that were assigned to be female and male (significant at the 1 
percent level).  Figure 3 illustrates this low versus high caste comparison graphically. The x-axis 
is the order in which the exams were graded. The dotted line signifies the assigned scores for the 
low caste group, while the straight line signifies this  for the high caste group.  As in the 
regression analysis, we find a gap in test scores between the low and high caste groups at the 
start of the grading order, but this effect fades as the place in the grading order increases.   
Taken together, these results start to suggest that when teachers are not confident with a 
testing instrument, discrimination is most likely to occur.  It appears that when grading students 
early in the process, when the overall distribution of scores is unknown, teachers may use the 
caste of a student not as a signal of performance, but rather as a signal of where the child will 
eventually land in the overall distribution of tests.  This also suggests that programs that improve 
teacher skills and comfort level with testing instruments, may also potentially reduce the 25 
 
discrimination seen in the classroom.  While this is not something we can fully verify in the 
context of this particular experiment, it provides guidance for future work. 
The second feature we attempted to incorporate into the exam was the level of 
subjectivity of the exam questions.  It is possible, for example, that the effects may be small if 
the teachers have little leeway in assigning points to the  exam questions.  We specifically 
included sections on the exam that had different levels of subjectivity.  And as demonstrated in 
Table 2, the relative subjectivity of these sections is borne  out by the significantly lower 
correlations between blind and non-blind scores on the exam’s art section relative to the other 
sections.  In Table 9, we present the results disaggregated by subject.  All specifications include 
the original test characteristics and grader fixed effects as controls.  Interestingly, we do not see 
significant differences across the three subjects.  Even on the art section, the observed reduction 
in test scores for lower caste students is similar to the estimates for the math section. 
To better understand these results, we took a closer look at the points assigned for each 
question on the exam.  We did not give the teachers advice about how to assign points for each 
question; we only provided guidance on the maximum number of possible points per question.  
Despite the fact that the questions on the test were relatively simple, the graders still made an 
effort to assign students partial credit for the questions on the Hindi section (and also, to a lesser 
degree, the math section).  Therefore, even though the art exam was the most subjective, in the 
end, all exams provided the teachers with some level of discretion.  
 
C.  Specific Characteristics of the Child and Teacher 
We, next, explore whether the results differ by the specific caste group of the child and whether 
different types of teachers exhibit different degrees of discrimination.   26 
 
In Table 10, we show the results by disaggregated caste groups.  While observed gender 
and age are still included in the specification, the results are near identical to Table 6 and, 
therefore, we omit them from the tables for conciseness.  All specifications also include the 
original test characteristics and grader fixed effects.   In Column 1, we show the main effects of 
each caste.  In Columns 2 and 3, we provide the results of specifications that include the 
interaction of the caste variable with the blind test score and an indicator variable for an above 
average score on the blind test, respectively.  Recall that the caste groups in terms of descending 
order of prestige are the Kshatriya, Vaishya, and Shudra. 
  We find significant differences between the exams that were assigned as belonging to the 
high caste groups and exams that were assigned as belonging to either the Kshatiya and Shudra 
groups (Column 1); the effect on exams that were assigned as belonging to the Vaishya group, 
while negative, is not significant at conventional levels (significant at 15% level).  We cannot 
reject the hypothesis that the coefficients on the three observed caste variables are significantly 
different from one another.  The results from Column 2 and Column 3 are consistent with those 
from Table 7.  Having an above average test scores increases the average scores for individuals 
labeled  as  the lower caste groups,  relative to those labeled as high caste.  This effect is 
particularly strong for the highest of the low caste groups (Kshatriya).   
Finally, we explore whether teachers differ in the degree to which they use students’ 
observed characteristics as proxies for actual performance.  We focus  on  the  four key 
characteristics that are the most theoretically relevant.  First, we explore whether the caste and 
gender of the teacher  affects the observed levels of discrimination.  For example, teachers’ 
beliefs on the average characteristics of children from a particular caste may be influenced by 
their own caste.  Lower caste teachers, for example, may be less likely to use caste as a proxy for 27 
 
performance given their intimate experience with low caste status or may feel partial towards 
helping someone from their own social group (in-group bias).  On the other hand, such teachers 
may have internalized a belief in the difference in ability as a means of rationalizing historical 
experience.  Thus, low caste teachers may discriminate more against very low status children.
12
We do not find evidence of in-group bias.  In fact, we observe the opposite.  We do not 
see any difference in test scores between exams assigned as belonging to the lower caste and 
  
We test for the presence of in-group bias among the teachers in our sample in regards to caste 
and gender.  In addition, we estimate whether the degree of discrimination varies by the teachers’ 
education levels or age.  More educated teachers may be more aware of and more tolerable of 
diversity,  whereas  older teachers may have more experience with individuals of different 
backgrounds or more experience with children of various backgrounds through more teaching 
experience. 
We present the results of our analysis in Table 11.  We present the results by caste, 
gender, master’s degree completion, and age in Panels A through D, respectively.  In Column 1, 
we show the results for the sample that is listed in the panel title, while in Column 2, we show 
the results for the remaining teachers.  In Column 3, we present the difference between the 
coefficients.  In Column 4, we present results of a specification that includes the interactions 
between the observed caste variables and all four teacher demographic variables.  All regressions 
include both original test characteristics and grader fixed effects.      
                                                 
12 Previous studies exploring how belonging to a group impacts a person’s treatment of others in that group have 
found, for the most part, evidence of in-group bias (positive discrimination towards members of your own group).  A 
series of experiments in the psychology literature have found that individuals presented in-group bias in even in 
artificially constructed groups (Vaughn, Tajfel, and Williams, 1981) or groups that were randomly assigned (Billig 
and Tajfel, 1973).   Turner and Brown (1978) studied “in-group bias” when “status” is conferred to the groups, and 
found that while all subjects were biased in favor of their own group, the groups identified as superior exhibited 
more in-group bias.  More recently, Klein and Azzi (2001) also find that both “inferior” and “superior” groups gave 
higher scores to people in their own group.  Using data from the game show “The Weakest Link,” Levitt (2004) find 
that some evidence that men vote more for men and women vote more for women.  For a good description of theory 
and literature of in-group bias the work of Anderson, Fryer, and Holt (2006). 28 
 
those assigned as belonging to the high caste for teachers of the high caste (Column 1, Panel A).  
However,  low caste teachers (Column  2) seem to have discriminated significantly  against 
members of their own group.  The difference between low and high caste teachers is large –about 
0.2 standard deviations—and significant  at the 10 percent level (Column 3).  Of course, as 
described in Table 1, lower caste teachers tend to come from a different socio-economic 
background than upper caste teachers (more likely to be male, less likely to have a master’s 
degree, etc), and these characteristics may account for the results we find, rather than caste.  To 
control for these possible confounds, in Column 4, we control for both the main characteristics 
and the interactions of the characteristics with the observed low caste status.  The results remain 
the same:  lower caste teachers significantly downgrade exams that are assigned to be lower 
caste, relative to the high caste teachers.   
Turning to gender, we also do not observe in-group bias.  We do not see a significant 
difference in the way female and male teachers grade exams that are randomly assigned to be 
male versus female.  In terms of caste, we observe that female teachers significantly grade down 
low caste exams, while male teachers do not.  However, the coefficient of the effects for male 
teachers is not significantly different than the coefficient for female teachers.  Moreover, while 
the  coefficients  are similar, the sample size of  the male teachers is much smaller (33 male 
teachers versus 87 female teachers), which may account for the higher variance in the estimates 
for the male teachers. 
While we find no significant difference in caste discrimination by teachers’ education or 
age, we find that more educated teachers and older teachers are more likely to give higher grades 
to exams that were assigned to be female.   
 29 
 
VI.  DISCUSSION 
We find that teachers provide exams that are assigned to be “lower caste” scores that are about 
0.03 to 0.09 standard deviations lower than those that are assigned to be “high caste.”   What is 
the underlying model that drives these results?  Economic theories of discrimination fall into two 
main categories.  The first type of models falls under the category of taste-based discrimination, 
in which  teachers may have particular preferences for individuals of a particular group or 
characteristic.  The second class of theories encompasses statistical discrimination, in which 
teachers may use observable characteristics to proxy for unobservable skills.     
  The empirical design should eliminate  the possibility of statistical discrimination, as 
teachers observe a measure of skill for the child:  the actual performance on the exam.  However, 
one can imagine a series of situations where the teacher may statistically discriminate.  First, the 
teacher may be lazy, and may not be invested in carefully studying the exam to determine the 
skill level for each child.  Thus, they may use the demographic variables to instead proxy for 
skill.  While we cannot fully rule out this story, the fact that the teachers knew that a fairly large 
prize was at stake increased the seriousness of the exercise   When they were confused, the 
teachers asked the project team questions on the grading and all of the teachers seemed to spend 
a fair bit of time grading each exam.  Moreover, if teachers were lazy, we may expect them to 
mark wrong answers as “0” right away, and not spend time thinking through the answer to 
determine the correct level of partial credit.  In fact, we observe the opposite:  teachers gave a 
considerable amount of partial credit for wrong answers.   Thus, it does not appear as though the 
teachers were slacking. 
Second, teachers may statistically discriminate if they are not confident about the testing 
instrument.  In particular, teacher may be unsure about what is the right level of partial credit to 30 
 
give per question and they may be also unsure about what the final distribution of grades will 
look like.  Thus, teachers may use the characteristics of a child, not as a signal of performance, 
but rather as a signal of where the child will end up in the distribution.  The data lends some 
credence to this theory:  discrimination tends to occur at the start of the grading order and fades 
over time.   
On the other hand, there is also considerable evidence that the discrimination is taste-
based.  First, if we expected the teachers to be statistically discriminating, we would expect them 
to use observed age to make predictions on the skills of the child, as the age variable has much 
more predictive power on test scores than caste.   However, they tend to discriminate on caste, 
but not age.  Thus, these results can imply taste-based discrimination, rather than just statistical 
discrimination.  Note, however, that we cannot rule out the fact that teachers have incomplete 
information, or are just bad at making statistical predictions of how children of particular groups 
will fare on the exams.   
Second, the gap in scores based on demographics varies by the quality of the exam:  low 
caste children are hurt when their exam quality is low to begin with and females are hurt when 
their exams are of high quality.  If the teachers were conducting statistical discrimination, we 
may not expect quality to matter as much. 
 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
While education has the power to transform the lives of the poor, children who belong to 
traditionally disadvantaged groups may not reap the full  benefits of education if teachers 
systematically discriminate against them.  Through an experimental design, we find evidence 
that teachers discriminate against low caste children in grading exams. For example, we find 31 
 
teachers give exams that are assigned to be upper caste test scores that are, on average, 0.03 to 
0.09 standard deviations higher than those assigned a lower caste classification.  We do not find 
any overall evidence of discrimination by gender or age.  Disaggregating the results by the 
quality of the exam, the low-performing low caste children and top-performing females tend to 
lose out the most due to discrimination.  Quite interestingly, we find that the discrimination 
against low caste students is driven by low caste teachers, while those teachers from the higher 
caste do not appear to discriminate at all.  
It is important to note that our study only reflects upon one element of discrimination 
within the classroom.  Discrimination may also exist in other forms:  calling on students of 
particular groups but not others, discouraging  those of certain groups from  furthering  their 
education, and so forth.  If, as we show, discrimination exists in the subtle grading of an exam, 
other more blatant types of discrimination may exist as well.  Therefore, our results provide 
additional motivation for research to investigate how the treatment of children within  the 
classroom differs by race, ethnicity, and gender. 
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High Caste Low Caste Female Male No Master's Master's
Characteristic (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Number of teachers 120 81 39 87 33 61 59
Upper Caste 0.68 1.00 0.00 0.75 0.48 0.61 0.75
Female 0.73 0.80 0.56 1.00 0.00 0.67 0.78
Age 35.33 36.77 32.33 36.33 32.67 32.92 37.81
Less than a Master's Degree 0.51 0.46 0.62 0.47 0.61 1.00 0.00
Private School 0.56 0.49 0.69 0.49 0.73 0.70 0.41
Closest Friend:  Same Caste Grouping 0.64 0.74 0.44 0.72 0.42 0.66 0.63
Belong to a Caste Association 0.41 0.39 0.46 0.44 0.33 0.42 0.41
0.81 0.83 0.77 0.82 0.79 0.80 0.81
1.  This table summarizes the characteristics and beliefs of the 120 teachers who participated in the grading sessions.
Table 1: Characteristics of the Teachers
A.  Teacher Characteristics
B.  Teacher Beliefs 
Notes:
Believe that teachers favor some students 
over others in their grading for reasons 
unrelated to their educational 
performance

















2. The original (true) characteristics, listed in Column 1, include
data on all 69 children who completed a test and a demographic
survey.  
3. Column 2 provides data on the characteristics that were
randomly assigned to the cover sheets of the tests that the teachers
graded. This column summarizes the data from the 3,000
coversheets in the study (25 for each of 120 teachers).
Table 2:  Child Characteristics
A.  High Caste 
C.  Other
B.  Lower Caste
1. This table summarizes both the real characteristics of the
children in our sample and the characteristics observed by the
teachers.  Teacher Scores Blind Test Score
(1) (2)












Observations 3000 69 Observations 3000 69
Notes:
1. This table summarizes the test scores from the exam tournament. The scores are
presented in terms of the percentage of total possible points.
2. Column 1 provides data on the 3,000 exams that were graded by the 120 teachers in
the study. Column 2 provides the results from a blind grading of the original 69
exams.
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1. Figure 1 provides the range of test scores (in percentages) given by the teachers for












1 1 12 13 14 15 16 1Test Type: Total Total Math Hindi Art
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant -5.348 -0.927 -0.941 -0.97 -1.094
(0.416)*** (0.164)*** (0.169)*** (0.191)*** (0.330)***
Low Caste -0.409 -0.013 -0.026 0.008 -0.111
(0.037)*** (0.014) (0.015)* (0.017) (0.029)***
Female 0.183 -0.011 0.006 -0.001 0.004
(0.029)*** (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.023)
Age 0.846 0.142 0.164 0.133 0.147
(0.079)*** (0.031)*** (0.032)*** (0.036)*** (0.062)**
Age^2 -0.03 -0.006 -0.007 -0.005 -0.007
(0.004)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.003)**
Blind Test Score 0.926 0.929 0.932 0.634
(0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.008)*** (0.014)***
Observations 3000 3000 3000 3000 3000
R-squared 0.28 0.89 0.9 0.85 0.5
4. Results that are statistically significant at the one, five, and ten percent levels are indicated by ***, **, and *
respectively.
Table 4:  Correlations between Original Characteristics and Final Test Scores
Note: 
1. This table contains the raw correlations between the grades awarded to the exams by teachers and the
children's original, unobserved characteristics.  
2. The first two columns contain results for the total test score, with and without controlling for the blind test
scores.   Columns 3 - 5 present the results, controlling for the blind test score, by exam section.
3. Child performance on each exam is measured using the score normalized to the overall exam score
distribution.Low Caste Female Age Total Math Hindi Art
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Low Caste -0.035 0.006 -0.071 -0.068 -0.062 -0.064 -0.054
(0.021) (0.027) (0.113) (0.054) (0.055) (0.054) (0.055)
Female -0.02 -0.022 -0.022 0.012 0.031 -0.001 -0.02
(0.014) (0.018) (0.075) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
Age -0.063 -0.100 0.053 -0.014 0.045 -0.076 -0.007
(0.045) (0.058)* (0.237) (0.114) (0.115) (0.114) (0.115)
Age^2 0.003 0.004 -0.003 0.001 -0.002 0.003 0.000
(0.002) (0.003)* (0.011) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Observations 3000 3000 3000 3000 3000 3000 3000
F-Stat 1.85 1.17 0.25 0.43 0.64 0.48 0.89
P-Value 0.1157 0.3215 0.9082 0.7889 0.6358 0.7501 0.4682
Note: 
3.  Results that are statistically significant at the one, five, and ten percent levels are indicated by ***, **, and * respectively.
Table 5:  Randomization Check
Blind Scores Actual Characteristics
1. This table contains regressions of the actual characteristics of the children of each exam on the characteristics randomly
assigned to the coversheet on the copy of the exam that was graded by a teacher.
2. The F-statistic and p-value provide a test of joint significance of the observed characteristics.Observed Characteristics (1) (2) (3) (4)
Low Caste -0.09 -0.087 -0.086 -0.027
(0.054)* (0.044)** (0.043)** (0.017)*
Female 0.022 0.015 0.014 0.008
(0.036) (0.029) (0.029) (0.011)
Age 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.001
(0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.003)
Original Test Characteristics YES YES YES
Grader Fixed Effect YES YES
Blind Test Score YES
Note:
3. Results that are statistically significant at the one, five, and ten percent levels are indicated by ***, 
**, and * respectively.
Table 6:  Effect of Observed Characteristics on Total Test Scores
1. Table 5 presents the regression of total normalized test scores on observed characteristics that were 
randomly assigned to the coversheets of test copies. 
2. The sample includes the 3,000 graded exams (graded in sets of 25 by 120 teachers).Observed Characteristics (1) (2) (3)
Constant -1.175 -3.264 5.04
(0.185)*** (0.328)*** (0.834)***
Low Caste -0.029 -0.108 -0.066
(0.017)* (0.049)** (0.058)
Female 0.008 0.107 -0.008
(0.011) (0.032)*** (0.035)
Age 0.001 0.000 -0.008
(0.003) (0.008) (0.009)
Low Caste * Blind Test Score 0.03
(0.018)*
Female * Blind Test Score -0.015
(0.011)
Age * Blind Test Score -0.002
(0.003)
Blind Test Score 0.921
(0.036)***
Low Caste * Above Average Blind Score 0.083
(0.062)
Female * Above Average Blind Score -0.11
(0.040)***




Low Caste * Blind Score < -1.1 -0.153
(0.091)*
Female * Blind Score < -1.1 0.054
(0.056)
Age * Blind Score < -1.1 0.002
(0.014)
Blind Score < -1.1 -1.726
  (0.175)***
Original Test Characteristics YES YES YES
Grader Fixed Effect YES YES YES
Notes:
5. Results that are statistically significant at the one, five, and ten percent levels are indicated by ***, **,
and * respectively.
4. The sample includes 3,000 graded exams (graded in sets of 25 by 120 teachers). 
Table 7:  Effect on Test Scores, by Exam Quality
1. This table explores whether discrimination varies by exam quality.
2. The outcome variable is the total normalized test score.
3. In Column 1, we interact the observed characteristics with the blind test score, while we interact the
observed characteristics with an indicator for above average blind score in Column 2. In Column 3, we
interact the observed characteristics with an indicator for below 1.1 standard deviations.Figure 2: The Caste Gap, by Blind Test Score Observed Characteristics (1) (2)
Constant -5.657 -5.872
(0.500)*** (0.479)***






Low Caste * Grading Order 0.011
(0.006)*
Female *  Grading Order 0.009
(0.004)**
Age *  Grading Order 0.000
(0.001)
 Grading Order -0.014
(0.013)
Low Caste * Start of Grading Order -0.120
(0.089)
Female * Start of Grading Order -0.102
(0.058)*
Age* Start of Grading Order 0.01
(0.015)
Start of Grading Order 0.035
(0.184)
Original Test Characteristics YES YES
Grader Fixed Effect YES YES
Note:
5. Results that are statistically significant at the one, five, and ten percent levels are indicated
by ***, **, and * respectively.
4. The sample includes 3,000 graded exams (graded in sets of 25 by 120 teachers). 
Table 8:  Effect on Test Scores, by Grading Order
2. Grading order is a variable that gives the order of the exam as graded by the teacher. This
variable ranges from 1 (1
st exam graded) to 25 (last exam graded). Start of grading order is an
indicator variable that equals one if grading order is less than or equal to twelve, and zero
otherwise.
1. This table explores whether the order in which the exam was graded affects the treatment of
exams assigned by observable characteristics.
3. The outcome variable is the total normalized total score.Figure 3:  The Caste Gap, by Grading OrderMath Hindi Art
(1) (2) (3)
Low Caste -0.072 -0.08 -0.058
(0.043)* (0.047)* (0.042)
Female 0.024 -0.004 0.011
(0.029) (0.031) (0.028)
Age 0.007 0.001 -0.005
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
Original Test Characteristics YES YES YES
Grader Fixed Effect YES YES YES
Note:
Table 9:  Effect on Test Scores, by Subject
1.This table presents the regression of normalized test scores for the indicated sections of
the exam on the observed characteristics that were randomly assigned to the coversheets.
2. The sample includes 3,000 graded exams (graded in sets of 25 by 120 teachers). 
3.  Results that are statistically significant at the one, five, and ten percent levels are 
indicated by ***, **, and * respectively.Observed Characteristics (1) (2) (3)
Constant -5.892 -1.18 -3.275
(0.471)*** (0.185)*** (0.328)***
Kshatriya -0.112 -0.03 -0.206
(0.057)* (0.022) (0.065)***
Vaishya -0.067 -0.023 -0.083
(0.045) (0.017) (0.051)
Shudra -0.112 -0.042 -0.114
(0.050)** (0.019)** (0.056)**
Kshatriya * Blind Test Score 0.028
(0.023)
Vaishya * Blind Test Score 0.029
(0.018)
Shudra  * Blind Test Score 0.033
(0.020)
Blind Test Score 0.92
(0.037)***
Kshatriya * Above Average Blind 0.187
(0.082)**
Vaishya * Above Average Blind 0.06
(0.065)




Original Test Characteristics YES YES YES
Grader Fixed Effect YES YES YES
Note:
Table 10:  Effect of Detailed Caste Groups on Total Test Scores
1.  This table presents estimates of the effect of observed caste disaggregated by specific 
4. Results that are statistically significant at the one, five, and ten percent levels are
indicated by ***, **, and * respectively.
2. The sample includes 3,000 graded exams (graded in sets of 25 by 120 teachers). 
3. The outcome variable in all regressions is the normalized total score.Yes No
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Low Caste -0.023 -0.227 0.197 0.204
(0.052) (0.078)*** (0.093)** (0.098)**
Female -0.01 0.059 -0.071 -0.058
(0.035) (0.051) (0.061) (0.065)
Age 0 0.008 -0.008 -0.01
(0.009) (0.013) (0.015) (0.016)
Low Caste -0.064 -0.094 0.031 0.105
(0.084) (0.051)* (0.097) (0.103)
Female 0.049 -0.001 0.056 0.03
(0.055) (0.034) (0.064) (0.068)
Age 0.009 0.001 0.008 0.007
(0.014) (0.008) (0.016) (0.017)
Low Caste -0.079 -0.09 0.011 -0.028
(0.062) (0.061) (0.087) (0.089)
Female 0.061 -0.033 0.093 0.127
(0.041) (0.040) (0.057) (0.059)**
Age 0.003 0.004 0 0.001
(0.010) (0.010) (0.014) (0.015)
Low Caste -0.135 -0.038 -0.099 -0.084
(0.061)** (0.062) (0.087) (0.092)
Female 0.061 -0.038 0.098 0.103
(0.040) (0.041) (0.057)* (0.061)*
Age 0 0.007 -0.007 -0.009
(0.010) (0.010) (0.014) (0.015)
Original Test Characteristics YES YES YES YES
Grader Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES
Note:
5.  Results that are statistically significant at the one, five, and ten percent levels are indicated by ***, **, and * respectively.
1.  This table presents estimates of discrimination disaggregated by the characteristics of the teachers.
2. Each panel contains four sets of estimates. Estimates presented in column one are for tests graded only by teachers who have the
characteristics indicated in the panel name. Column two contains estimates using only tests for teachers that do not have the indicated
characteristic. Finally, column three presents an estimate of the coefficient on the interaction of the teacher's characteristic with the indicated
observed child characteristics. Column four presents the same interaction but from a specification that includes interactions with the teacher
characteristics from all of the panels. 
3. The sample includes 3,000 graded exams (graded in sets of 25 by 120 teachers). 
4.  The outcome in every regression is the normalized total score.
A.  Upper Caste
B.  Male
C.  Masters Degree
D.  Below Median Age
Table 11:  Effect on Test Scores, by Teacher Type
Difference 
Difference (Conditional 
on other teacher 
characteristics)
Teachers of the indicated 
category?Total Total Math Hindi Art
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Constant -4.928 -0.929 -0.874 -1.021 -1.054
(0.403)*** (0.165)*** (0.171)*** (0.193)*** (0.333)***
Kshatriya -0.161 -0.012 0 -0.01 -0.083
(0.042)*** (0.017) (0.018) (0.020) (0.034)**
Vaishya -0.516 -0.016 -0.033 0.003 -0.127
(0.039)*** (0.016) (0.017)** (0.019) (0.033)***
Shudra -1.171 -0.012 -0.03 0.042 -0.176
(0.068)*** (0.029) (0.030) (0.033) (0.055)***
Unknown -0.336 -0.009 -0.049 0.036 -0.106
(0.045)*** (0.018) (0.019)** (0.021)* (0.037)***
Female 0.213 -0.012 0.003 -0.002 0.007
(0.028)*** (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.024)
Age 0.781 0.142 0.151 0.143 0.139
(0.076)*** (0.031)*** (0.032)*** (0.037)*** (0.063)**
Age^2 -0.027 -0.006 -0.007 -0.006 -0.006
(0.004)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.003)**
Blind Test Score 0.926 0.926 0.935 0.631
(0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.009)*** (0.014)***
Observations 3000 3000 3000 3000 3000
R-squared 0.34 0.89 0.9 0.85 0.5
Appendix Table 1:  Correlations between Original Characteristics and Final Test Scores
Note: 
1. This table contains the raw correlations between the grades awarded to the exams by teachers and the children's original,
unobserved characteristics.  
2. The first two columns contain results for the total test score, with and without controlling for the blind test scores.
Columns 3 - 5 present the results, controlling for the blind test score, by exam section.
3.  Results that are statistically significant at the one, five, and ten percent levels are indicated by ***, **, and * Brahmin Kshatriya Vaishya Shudra Unknown Female Age Total Math Hindi Art
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Kshatriya 0.041 -0.004 -0.039 0.024 -0.023 0.038 -0.199 -0.106 -0.093 -0.111 -0.062
(0.028) (0.032) (0.035) (0.017) (0.028) (0.036) (0.150) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072)
Vaishya 0.039 -0.026 -0.041 0.016 0.012 0.001 -0.079 -0.059 -0.056 -0.057 -0.035
(0.022)* (0.025) (0.027) (0.013) (0.022) (0.029) (0.118) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057)
Shudra 0.024 -0.027 0.009 0.007 -0.013 -0.001 0.01 -0.068 -0.061 -0.056 -0.087
(0.025) (0.027) (0.030) (0.015) (0.024) (0.031) (0.129) (0.063) (0.063) (0.062) (0.063)
Female 0.02 -0.01 0.006 -0.009 -0.007 -0.021 -0.026 0.011 0.03 -0.002 -0.02
(0.014) (0.016) (0.017) (0.008) (0.014) (0.018) (0.075) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
Age 0.063 -0.034 0.053 -0.032 -0.05 -0.101 0.055 -0.013 0.046 -0.074 -0.005
(0.045) (0.050) (0.055) (0.027) (0.045) (0.058)* (0.237) (0.115) (0.115) (0.114) (0.115)
Age^2 -0.003 0.002 -0.002 0.001 0.002 0.004 -0.003 0.001 -0.002 0.003 0
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)* (0.011) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Observations 3000 3000 3000 3000 3000 3000 3000 3000 3000 3000 3000
F-Stat 1.38 0.47 1.41 1.06 0.95 1.08 0.61 0.4 0.5 0.48 0.83
P-Value 0.2184 0.8309 0.2084 0.3839 0.4613 0.3723 0.7212 0.8798 0.8106 0.8239 0.5469
Note: 
3.  Results that are statistically significant at the one, five, and ten percent levels are indicated by ***, **, and * respectively.
2. The F-statistic and p-value provide a test of joint significance of the observed characteristics.
1. This table contains regressions of the actual characteristics of the children on the characteristics randomly assigned to the coversheet of the exam that was graded by
the teachers.  
Blind Scores
Appendix Table 2:  Randomization Check with Full Set of Caste Variables
Actual Characteristics